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Pursuant to Rules 24,26 and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellee
Questar Gas Company ("Questar") submits its Responsive Brief in the captioned case.
L PRELIMINARY MATTERS
A.

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT

Questar agrees that this Court has jurisdiction.
B,

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented are:
1.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the signatories to the document titled

Right-of-Way and Easement Grant intended to grant the easement set forth within the four
corners of the document?
2.

Did the trial court correctly conclude that the Utah Builder's Statute of Repose,

Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 ("the Statute of Repose"), is applicable to bar K. H.
Traveller Investments, LLC ("Traveller") from asserting claims of ejectment, declaratory
relief and quiet title?
3.

As a primary element in Issue No. 2, did the trial court correctly conclude that

the natural gas pipeline was an "improvement," as defined in the Statute of Repose?
Contrary to Traveller's assertion, there are no factual issues to be resolved by the
trial court. (Traveller's issue number (1)). Both parties represented, during the course of
the proceedings below, that there were no issues of material fact. Traveller represented, on
the record, that "[djespite what either party has said to the contrary in its Motion for
#174939
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Summary Judgment, there are no disputes of materialfact. . .. Essentially, both parties
have asked the Court to examine the 'Right-of-Way Easement Grant' document on itsface
and within its four corners" Traveller's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Rule
56(f) Motion to Continue Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 152 (emphasis
added)). Traveller further stated, "Intent and notice are immaterial to the resolution of the
parties' Motions for Summary Judgment because the Court can examine the document on
its face and within its four corners and make a ruling." (R. at 154 (emphasis added)).
Traveller's attempt to now create an issue of fact related to the Burgesses intent should be
disregarded.
The issues presented involve solely questions of law and are to be reviewed for
correctness. Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, \ 37, 44 P.3d 781.
C-

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES

The only determinative statute is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5, the Statute of
Repose. The text of the statute is set out as Addendum No. 3 in Traveller's Brief.
D.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of the Case. This case deals with Traveller's desire to force Questar

to move an existing high-pressure natural gas feeder utility line from one portion of
Traveller's property to another (at no cost to Traveller) so that Traveller can develop a
portion of its property presently encumbered by the utility line. The utility line at issue has
been in place since December 22, 1988. Ten years after the utility line was placed,
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Traveller purchased the property. Three and one-half years after the purchase, Traveller
brought its lawsuit to try to force Questar to relocate or remove the utility line.
2.

Course of Proceedings. Traveller filed its Complaint on July 26, 2002. It

sought declaratory relief, stating that "[Questar's] predecessor-in-interest, Mountain Fuel
Supply Company, attempted to obtain an easement for the installation of a natural gas
utility line" and requested that the trial court rule that this attempt is not a valid easement
("First Cause of Action," R. 3-4). Traveller also claimed that the utility line trespasses
upon Traveller's property ("Second Cause of Action," R. 4), and that the utility line causes
a private nuisance ("Third Cause of Action," R. 5-6).
On October 9, 2002, Questar filed its Motion for Summary Judgment before any
discovery, other than initial disclosures, had begun. In its motion, Questar argued that
Traveller's claims should be dismissed with prejudice as a matter of law because (a) the
doctrine of after-acquired title applies to the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant and
renders it fully valid and enforceable, and (b) the Statute of Repose bars Traveller's claims
to force Questar to move its utility line at no cost to Traveller.
Traveller responded by filing a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment requesting
that the trial court rule on its "declarative relief cause of action to "resolve the threshold
issue of whether [Questar] has a valid easement based upon the uncontrovertedfacts set
forth above." (R. 112 (emphasis added)). Traveller's cross-motion was unclear as to
whether Traveller contended that the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant could be
interpreted on its face, or whether it contended that extrinsic evidence regarding intent
#174939
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would be needed. To clarify this, Questar moved under Rule 56(f) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure to have Traveller's Cross-Motion continued on the grounds that, if the
document were determined to be ambiguous or the intent not clear, Questar should be
allowed to conduct further discovery regarding intent, notice and other factors. (R. 14548). However, if the document were to be found unambiguous on its face and the trial
court could interpret it, then the trial court should rule. Traveller responded to Questar's
Motion by clarifying its position and affirming that there were no disputes as to any
material fact and that, for purposes of the Motions for Summary Judgment, the trial court
could interpret the document on its face and within its four corners. (R. 152, 154).
The trial court granted Questar's Motion to Continue Traveller's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment. Neither the trial court nor Questar ever considered Traveller's
Motion to still be at issue when Questar's Motion was granted. Traveller's present
assertions to the contrary lack support. Traveller's Cross-Motion was not "renewed," nor
is it at issue now. There is no record showing that the trial court entered a new order to
modify its previous order continuing Traveller's motion.
3,

Disposition Below. After oral argument, the trial court ruled in favor of

Questar on two independent grounds: (a) the doctrine of after-acquired title validates and
makes effective the granted easement as recorded; and (b) the Statute of Repose bars
Traveller's claims to force Questar to move its utility line at no cost to Traveller.

#174939
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4.

Statement of Facts. On summary judgment, only material facts are to be

considered. The trial court carefully set forth facts that were both material to the legal
conclusions and uncontroverted. These facts are as follows:
a.

On December 2,1988, Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess (the

"Burgesses") signed their names to the second page of a document entitled "Right-of-Way
and Easement Grant" in a signature block below the words "agreed and warranted," which
purportedly1 granted Questar's predecessor, Mountain Fuel Supply Company ("Mountain
Fuel") and its successors and assigns a specific right-of-way and easement twenty-two (22)
feet wide to "lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace pipe lines,
valves, valve boxes and other gas transmission and distribution facilities through and
across" the property described more specifically in subparagraph c below (the "Subject
Property"). (R. 28, 45-46, 527).
b.

On December 2, 1988, the Burgesses were not the legal owners of the

Subject Property; rather, they were beneficiaries of a trust deed recorded against the
Subject Property. (R. 527).
c.

On December 22, 1988, Mountain Fuel Supply Company, installed a

high-pressure natural gas utility line across the Subject Property which is described as

1

Traveller has seized on the word "purportedly" in the trial court's order (R. 527,
U 2) to be a sign of a disputed fact. "Purportedly" in this context meant only that the court
concluded the Burgesses thought they were conveying and granting an easement at a time
when they did not yet have the authority to do so. It did not mean that there is a dispute
about their intentions.
#174939
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follows: the Northeast Quarter of Section 2, Township 42 South, Range 16 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian, and the Southeast Quarter of Section 35, Township 42 South,
Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. (R. 28, 527).
d.

On August 7, 1989, the Burgesses became the owners of the Subject

Property through a Trustee's Deed Upon Sale. (R. 29-30, 527).
e.

On February 5,1992, Mountain Fuel caused to be recorded the Right-of-

Way and Easement Grant document. (R. 29, 45, 527).
f.

On September 24, 1992, the Burgesses quit-claimed their interest in the

Subject Property to "Berniece B. Swart, Trustee, or her successor in trust as Trustee of the
R&E Farms Trust under agreement dated September 17, 1992." (R. 29, 528).
g.

On December 31, 1998, Berniece B. Swart, Trustee of the R&E Farms

Trust, conveyed the Subject Property by Warranty Deed to K. H. Traveller Investments,
LLC, specifically subject to "Easements, Rights of Way and Restrictions of Record."
(R. 29, 53, 528).
h.

Traveller filed its Complaint in this matter on July 26, 2002. (R. 1-9,

i.

Neither Questar nor Mountain Fuel has claimed a prescriptive easement

528).

in the Subject Property. (R. 528).
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Other "statements of fact" set forth in Traveller's Brief of Appellant ("Traveller's
Brief) are immaterial. It does not matter who the owner of the property was when the
Right-of-Way and Easement Grant was signed. Instead, it matters only that Burgesses later
became the owners. These are the only points material to the after-acquired title doctrine.
Furthermore, the trial-court record is completely silent as to when Traveller discovered the
utility line. Thus, it is not only immaterial, but there is no trial-court record concerning the
point. Finally, the trial court determined that the opinion of a real estate appraiser
regarding definitions of terms was both immaterial and without merit. (R. 530).
II. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
As a matter of law, the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant is valid and enforceable.
This written document constitutes either an actual grant of an easement before and without
any court action, or it is an attempt to grant an easement that became subject to the doctrine
of after-acquired title, and became fully enforceable upon transfer of title to the Burgesses.
The law of after-acquired title provides that easements obtained under circumstances like
those here are fully enforceable and valid. It provides that parties who, like the Burgesses,
do not have title to the property at issue but sign a Right-of-Way and Easement Grant and
intended3 to grant an easement, will be bound by that easement if they later acquire the

2

See, e.g., Traveller's Brief tU 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13.

3

Notably, Traveller did not properly raise any issues of intent before the trial court
ruled on this matter, and it cannot raise such issues now on appeal. Walter v. Stewart, 2003
UT App 86, H 33, 67 P.3d 1042, cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946.
#174939
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property. Here, the trial court properly evaluated the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant
on its face and the subsequent 1989 Trustee's Deed Upon Sale and concluded that, as a
matter of law, there was a valid grant of an easement. The trial court's decision is correct
and should not be disturbed.
The trial court was also correct in its determination that, as an entirely separate and
distinct ground for dismissal, the Statute of Repose barred Traveller's claims. Central to
this determination, the trial court correctly noted that a natural gas utility line is an "improvement" under the definition set forth in the Statute of Repose. Utah's state legislature
was unequivocal in defining "improvement," as it is used in the statute, to include "any . . .
infrastructure, utility, or other similar man-made change, addition, modification or
alteration to real property." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(l)(d) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis
added). Traveller's attempts to superimpose some other definition drawn from materials
outside the Statute of Repose is directly contrary to the express intent of the Statute of
Repose. The Statute of Repose makes clear that the legislature intended to protect those
who provide man-made alterations to the property regardless of what might be deemed an
"improvement" in another context. Tax statutes and common dictionary definitions are
irrelevant, pctrticularly when the legislature is as unequivocal as it was in drafting the
Statute of Repose. Similarly, case law from other states whose statutes do not clearly
define the term "improvement" is simply irrelevant.
Additionally, the Statute of Repose does not contain any "exemption" for a quiettitle action. Like other causes of action, quiet-title is subject to the statutes of limitations
#174939
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and repose, such as those limiting claims based upon contracts, fraud, trespass or
negligence, as well as those affecting an improvement to real property (as defined by the
Statute of Repose). The plain language of the Statute of Repose states that it will apply to
all causes of action and that the only effect it will have on other limitation periods will be
to not extend such periods. The plain language does not prohibit shortening limitation
periods that would otherwise be applicable.
Finally, there were and are no issues of material fact that preclude affirming the trial
court's result.

Traveller's belated assertion that some issue exists concerning the

Burgesses' intent in signing the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant is directly contrary to
the clear expression of intent contained on the face of the document, it is pure conjecture,
and is contrary to Traveller's representations to the trial court. Traveller presented no
evidence—by affidavit or otherwise—suggesting that the intent was anything other than
that expressed in the document itself.
III. ARGUMENT
A.

T H E AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE DOCTRINE RENDERS THE RIGHT-OF-WAY
AND EASEMENT GRANT FULLY ENFORCEABLE AND VALID.

The Right-of-Way and Easement Grant is clear on its face and, after examining the
document, the trial court correctly concluded that "[t]he Right-of-Way and Easement Grant
shows that Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth Burgess intended io grant Mountain Fuel and
its successors and assigns an easement and right-of-way according to the terms set forth
within the document." (R. 535, emphasis added). There is nothing within the Right-of#174939
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Way and Easement Grant to suggest a contrary intent. Upon determining that the intent of
the Burgesses was clear within the document itself, the trial court then properly applied the
after-acquired title doctrine to conclude the document that purported to grant the easement
became an actual and valid grant of the easement when the Burgesses acquired actual title.
1.

Under the Doctrine of After-Acquired Title, the Right-of-Way and
Easement Grant is Valid.

The trial court's detailed order shows that the court employed the appropriate
analysis of the undisputed material facts and the law to reach the conclusion that the Rightof-Way and Easement Grant is valid and enforceable.
Utah statutory law provides:
If any person shall hereafter convey any real estate by conveyance
purporting to convey the same in fee simple absolute, and shall not at the
time of such conveyance have the legal estate in such real estate, but shall
afterwards acquire the same, the legal estate subsequently acquired shall
immediately pass to the grantee, his heirs, successors, assigns, and such
conveyance shall be as valid as if such legal estate had been in the grantor at
the time of the conveyance.
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-10 (2000). The Utah Supreme Court has recently extended the
doctrine of after-acquired title or estoppel by deed to apply to written attempts to grant
easements. Arnold Industries v. Love, 2002 UT 133, 63 P.3d 721. It reasoned that "[t]o
allow a grantor to deny the terms of its conveyance after acquiring title by repudiating an
easement originally intended to be granted would be an invitation to fraud and would
contravene the central purpose of the equitable doctrine of estoppel by deed." Id. at % 18.

#174939
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In the present matter, there is no dispute that the document was signed by the
Burgesses, the very people who later obtained the property. Moreover, after examining the
face of the document, the trial court concluded that it clearly "shows that Rodney C .
Burgess and Elizabeth Burgess intended to grant Mountain Fuel and its successors and
assigns an easement and right-of-way according to the terms set forth within the document." (R. 535). Despite Traveller's claims, nothing in the record supports a contrary
conclusion.
Having reached this conclusion, the trial court applied Arnold and determined that
the doctrine of after-acquired title applied. The Right-of-Way and Easement Grant was, in
the terms of § 57-1-10, a "conveyance purporting to convey" the easement, by the
Burgesses, who did not at the time "have the legal estate in such real estate," but
afterwards "acquire[d] the same." Accordingly, "the legal estate subsequently acquired
shall immediately pass to" Mountain Fuel (Questar) and "such conveyance shall be as valid
as if such legal estate had been in [the Burgesses] at the time of conveyance." See Arnold,
at ^[ 15. In the face of the undisputed facts, the trial court correctly concluded that,
pursuant to the doctrine of after-acquired title, the easement became valid upon the
conveyance of the property to the Burgesses. The court said, "[t]hrough the doctrine of the
after-acquired title that within the four corners of the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant,
Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess granted an easement to Mountain Fuel and
that the document is a valid conveyance of the described easement." (R. 536). It could
reach no other conclusion.
#174939
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2.

The Trial Court Correctly Determined That the Right-of-Way and
Easement Grant Was Not Ambiguous and That It Could Be Interpreted
Within its Four Corners,

Regardless of whether Traveller claims that intent was clear from the document, the
trial court properly looked only to the document to determine the Burgesses' intent. It is
well-established law that, if a document is clear, extrinsic evidence is not needed. In
Meridian Ditch Company, Inc. v. Koosharem Irrigation Co., 660 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah
1983), the Utah Supreme Court discussed the issue, stating "[b]eing thus unambiguous, it
would be superfluous, and moreover, inappropriate, to consider extrinsic evidence in
determining the provision's meaning." This rule applies equally to documents involving
real property. In Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, ]f 37,44 P.3d 781, the Supreme Court stated
"[d]eeds are construed like other written legal instruments." The Supreme Court further
remarked that, like any other document, "we determine the parties' intent from the plain
language of the four corners of the deed." Id. at ^J 38.
The trial court rightly declined to consider extrinsic evidence because it determined
that the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant was unambiguous. The trial court observed
that, although the Burgesses are not specifically identified as "grantors" on the document,
they "did acknowledge that they 'warranted' the conveyance stated within the document."
(R. 534). According to the Court, therefore, it was as if the Burgesses had been the
"grantors." (R. 534). The court continued, stating "[t]he term 'warrant' as used in a
conveyance means both to assure the title to the property sold by an express covenant and
that the title of the grantee shall be good, and the possession undisturbed." (R. 534-35).
#174939

-12-

Indeed, the first line of the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant states that the grantor
"do[es] hereby convey and warrant to Mountain Fuel Supply Company...," showing that
it was the grantors' intent to warrant the right-of-way and easement identified in the
document. (R. 45 (emphasis added)). Therefore, when the Burgesses signed off on their
intent to warrant the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant, they were using the identical
language set forth at the beginning of the document.4
The Right-of-Way and Easement Grant contains the language needed to grant the
right of way and easement, provides for maintenance of the easement, and sets forth limits
to the use of the easement. These facts show a clear and undisputed intent to convey a
right-of-way and an easement to Questar's predecessor, Mountain Fuel. Nothing in the
document even hints of some alternate use or meaning.
Traveller now makes the unsupported claim that the Right-of-Way and Easement
Grant was ambiguous and requests a remand to the trial court for a factual determination.
Not only is the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant unambiguous, there is simply no factual
information that would suggest that the Burgesses harbored any other intent in signing it.

4

The copy of the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant attached to Traveller's
Appellant Brief as Addendum 1 is not a true and correct copy of the document in the trial
court's record. The back page of Appellant's Addendum No. 1, has lines near the
signatures and the words "agreed and warranted" on the original. (R. 46). A true and
correct copy of the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant is provided herewith as Exhibit A
to the Addendum.
#174939
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3.

There Are No Disputed Issues of Fact as to Whether the Right-of-Way
and Easement Grant Is Unambiguous on its Face.

The trial court was correct in examining the face of the document to determine
intent. Traveller's claim that it "argued that it was necessary for the trial court to receive
evidence to determine exactly what Rodney C. Burgess and Elizabeth L. Burgess intended
when they signed their names" is directly contrary to the record.5 Traveller's Brief at 11.
Indeed, Traveller itself asserted below that no material facts were at issue. Traveller's
Memorandum in Opposition to Questar's Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed
on November 6,2002, was unclear as to whether Traveller claimed a disputed issue of fact
existed.

(R. 95).

Traveller clarified the ambiguity in its pleading when, in its

Memorandum in Opposition to Questar's Rule 56(f) Motion to Continue Traveller's
Motion for Summary Judgment, it said, "[d]espite what either party has said to the contrary
in its Motion for Summary Judgment, there are no disputes of materialfact and/or need for
the parties to undertake additional discovery before the Court may properly rule on the
parties' Motions for Summary Judgment." (R. 152, emphasis added). Traveller went on to
state "[essentially, both parties have asked the Court to examine the 'Right-of-Way and
Easement Grant' document on itsface and within itsfour corners...."

(R. 152 (emphasis

added)).

5

The record before this Court contains only those pleadings and memoranda that
the parties submitted to the trial court. It does not include the transcript of oral arguments.
Traveller has "certifie[d] that no transcript of any district court hearing is required to
supplement the record on appeal." (R. 543).
#174939
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In fact, Traveller was quite emphatic that there was no need to look outside of the
document itself to determine the intent of the Burgesses, stating in the same Memorandum
that u[i]ntent and notice are immaterial to the resolution of the parties' Motions for
Summary Judgment because the Court can examine the document on itsface and within its
four corners and make a ruling on both parties' Motions for Summary Judgment." (R. 154
(emphasis added)). Until now both parties and the trial court all agreed that no issues of
disputed fact existed, and that the trial court was merely considering issues of law.
Traveller erroneously interprets the trial court's acknowledgment of the defect in the
original conveyance as a factual dispute when it was simply a predicate to the application
of the after-acquired title doctrine. If the document clearly sets forth all of the information
needed to grant the conveyance, there would be no need to apply the after-acquired title, as
the document would already be the conveyance. The after-acquired title doctrine presumes
that the original conveyance was technically defective and that other, equitable reasons
support its enforcement. What Traveller advances as an ambiguity between the trial
court's statement of a material undisputed fact and its ultimate conclusion is nothing more
than the very analysis intended by the doctrine of after-acquired title.
Moreover, if Traveller saw an issue of fact during the proceedings below, it was
obligated to raise the issue then. It did not. Traveller cannot, at this late date, change its
approach. This Court should reject Traveller's manufactured argument that further
discovery or a resolution of a factual issue is necessary.
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Finally, Traveller offers no admissible evidence to sustain its claim that there is a
genuine fact in dispute that precludes disposition on summary judgment. In order to
sustain such a claim, Traveller must show by "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits"6 that there is a genuine
issue of material fact. Traveller has cited none of these indicia of a bonafidematerial fact.
Although Traveller made a claim in its Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment7 that there is
a "material dispute of fact" (R.95, \ 4), it has provided no evidence that there actually is
such a dispute. Its conjectures and assertions that there is an issue of material fact do not
create one. Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794 (Utah App. 1987). Absent some admissible
evidence to the contrary, Traveller's claims of disputed fact cannot prevail.
B.

T H E STATUTE O F REPOSE W A S INTENDED TO AND DOES BAR ACTIONS
DIRECTED TO QUESTAR'S UTILITY LINE, W H I C H IS A STATUTORY
IMPROVEMENT TO REAL PROPERTY.

Because the application of the doctrine of after-acquired title directly resolves the
issues on appeal, this Court need go no further. However, the Statute of Repose provides a
second independent ground for upholding the trial court's dismissal of Traveller's
Complaint.
The Statute of Repose provides that "[a]n action by or against a provider based in
contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of the date of completion of the
6

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

7

Traveller's November 11, 2002 Rule 56 Cross-Motion was combined with its
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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improvement or abandonment of construction...." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5 (Supp.
2004). Traveller does not dispute that Mountain Fuel was a "provider," and that Traveller
did not commence this action within the time limits imposed by the Statute of Repose.
Traveller's sole contention is that the natural gas utility line at issue is not an
"improvement," as that term is used in the Statute of Repose. (R. 99-103).
Contrary to Traveller's assertion, the statute unequivocally defines the term
"improvement" to include "any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other
similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(l)(d) (emphasis added). As described at greater length below,
this term applies directly to this case. Moreover, under the statute, any claim by Traveller
against the pipeline installed by Questar had to have been brought within the time
prescribed by the Statute of Repose—i.e., by December 22,2000. Traveller's Complaint
was filed on July 26, 2002, long after the statute had run.
1.

Questar's Pipeline Is an "Improvement'' as Defined by the Statute of
Repose.

The meaning of the word "improvement" as used in Statute of Repose expressly
includes utilities and any man-made alteration to real property. In Brixen & Christopher
Architects, P.C. v. State, 2001 UT App 210, 29 P.3d 650, this Court discussed statutory
construction, stating: "When 'statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we do not look
beyond the language's plain meaning to divine legislative intent.'" Id. at ^f 14 (citations
omitted). "Moreover, 'the interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court
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has no power to rewrite the statute to conform with an intention not expressed.'" Id. at
\ 15 (citations omitted). Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-11 (Supp. 2004) states that,
"words and phrases . . . defined by statute [ ] are to be construed according to such . ..
definition.55
The mandate to the courts is clear. This Court must approach the interpretation of
the words used in the statute with the understanding that the Legislature used each word
and combination of words intentionally and should not substitute any other definition or
meanings for words that are defined by the Legislature.
"When faced with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the
plain language of the statute.55... . "We presume that the legislature used
each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary
and accepted meaning.55. .. . Furthermore, "courts are not to infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and the court has no power to
rewrite the statute to confirm to an intention not expressed.55
CT. ex rel Taylor v. Johnson, 1999 UT 35, \ 9, 977 P.2d 479 (citations omitted).
Although it is the Legislature's prerogative to modify a term by expanding or limiting its
definition, once the Legislature defines a term, a reviewing court has no authority to assign
it a different or contrary meaning.
The Utah Supreme Court has rejected attempts to replace or modify statutory terms
with other definitions. Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2002 UT 30, \ 17, 44 P.3d 767. The
Court of Appeals in Roberts relied on a definition of "place open for public view55 from
other jurisdictions rather than using the definition of the term found in the Salt Lake City
ordinances. Salt Lake City v. Roberts, 2000 UT App 201,ffif8-11, 7 P.3d 789. The
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Supreme Court overturned that conclusion, stating "Salt Lake City contends that, in
interpreting this language, the Court of Appeals should not have relied on the case law of
other jurisdictions, but instead on the definition provided by the Salt Lake City Council
We agree" Id, at \ 17 (emphasis added).
Traveller urges this Court to replace the Legislature's definition of the word
"improvement" with either (a) the definition proposed by a property-value appraiser, which
is similar to that used in Utah's tax code, or (b) with the definition used in other states
whose statutes lack a specific definition for the word. Neither proposed definition is
relevant or applicable.

Traveller urges this replacement with the proposition that

"improvement" must have the same meaning in all real property- related statutes. Such a
proposition is without support. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court has determined that the
same term can have distinctly different meanings, even when the term is used in related
statutes. InO'Keefe v. Utah State Retirement Board, 956 P.2d 279, 280 (Utah 1998), the
Supreme Court noted that, when a word ("overtime") was defined in one statute, other
definitions outside the statute were irrelevant to determining its meaning, and when the
word was undefined in another statute, outside definitions were relevant in determining its
meaning.
In enacting the Statute of Repose, the Legislature adopted a specific definition for
"improvement," which is purposely different from the use of the word in other statutes that
deal with real property. In applying the definition of "improvement," the Court must rule
that the broad definition set forth in the Builder's Statute of Repose governs.
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Traveller argues that the definition of the Legislature is at odds with the "common
sense" approach, claiming that it does not comport with the Black's Law Dictionary
definition. However, this is not the case. Quite apart from the irrelevance of definitions
external to the statute, the Black's definition relied on by Traveller includes an addition to
o

property that "increases . . . its utility." Because of this feeder utiltiy line, natural gas is
now available to the very buildings Traveller has erected on its property, thereby increasing
the general functionality and value of that property. Even before these buildings were
constructed, the existence of the utility line helped it adapt to the further purpose of
commercial development. If there are no feeder utility lines, there can be no gas-delivery
utility lines and no gas delivery. Feeder utility lines are the means to supply natural gas to
the delivery system and then to the buildings ultimately constructed, thereby enhancing the
general "utility" of the properties.
None of Traveller's proposed definitions of "improvement" are applicable here.
The presence of an express definition in the statute renders Traveller's proposed definitions
irrelevant. This Court is bound to look first to the definition set forth in the statute. Under
that definition, "improvement" includes infrastructure, utilities and "other similar manmade changefsj, addition[s], modification^], or alteration^] to real property." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-21 (5) (emphasis added). The utility line is plainly infrastructure and a utility.
8

Black's Law Dictionary at 7'61 (6th ed. 1999). Interestingly, Black's 7th Edition
has restructured the definition of "improvement," and it reads somewhat differently from
that cited in Traveller's Brief.
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Indeed, this line is a "utility" as defined by the Utah State Legislature. In Utah Code Ann.
§ 54-2-1, the term "'public utility' includes every... gas corporation . . . . " Pursuant to
that same statute, Questar in general, and this pipeline in particular, are utilities regulated
by the Utah Public Service Commission. The utility line at issue in this case is, in every
sense of the word, a "utility." The utility line is also unquestionably a change, addition,
modification or alteration to the real property.
Additionally, the Statute of Repose is specific, and its application to Questar's
utility line does not render Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-1 "meaningless," as suggested by
Traveller. That provision is quite specific that no action may be commenced after the
specified time with respect to "improvements." The statute is not plenary and it does
nothing to modify the state of the law regarding a variety of other interests and
circumstances. The Statute of Repose does not, as Traveller implies, eviscerate the law
governing all prescriptive easements. Rather, the Legislature deliberately provided a
carefully circumscribed safe harbor for "providers" who installed "improvements."
Questar is entitled to the benefits of that safe harbor.
In a final effort to avoid the consequences of the Statute of Repose, Traveller argues
that Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah App. 1994),
established that the Statute of Repose applied only to unsafe conditions. The case has no
application here, because the Maack Court was interpreting the statute as it existed in 1967,
many years before the sweeping changes of 1991. Id. at 580 n. 10. The Court should
therefore disregard Traveller's attempt to apply a long-superseded decision.
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2.

A Review of the Legislative Record Is Unncessary Because the Legislative
Intent Is Plainly Set Forth in the Statute.

There is no need for an examination of the legislative history of the Statute of
Repose. The Utah Supreme Court has made clear that such analyses are only appropriate
and necessary when the statute itself is vague. The Court reiterated in Wood v. University
of Utah Medical Center, 2002 UT 134, \ 19, 67 P.3d 436 (emphasis added), that it is not
always necessary to analyze legislative history:
Plaintiffs' contention that the statute's legislative history evidences that the
statute's purpose is to prevent or hinder abortions is unavailing as we need
not examine the legislative history of this statute to discover the legislative
intent. "When examining a statute, we look first to its plain language as the
best indicator of the legislature's intent and purpose in passing the statute."
Wilsonv. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416,418 (Utah 1998). Legislators
may decide that a statute should be passed for myriad, often even different,
reasons, but where the legislative purpose is expressly stated and agreed to
as part of the legislation, we do not look to the views expressed by one or
more legislators in floor debates, committee minutes, or elsewhere, in
determining the intent of the statute.
In this case, the legislative intent is expressly stated in the statute, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-12-21.5(2) (Supp. 2004) (emphasis added):
(2) The Legislature finds that:
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of duty after the possibility of injury or damage has become
highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to the provider
and the citizens of the state;
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records
storage costs, undue and unlimited liability risks during the life of both a
provider and an improvement, and difficulties in defending against claims
many years after completion of an improvement;
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic
evils;
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(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and
unexpected ten years following completion or abandonment;
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of
the citizens of the state to impose the periods of limitation and repose
provided in this chapter upon all causes of action by or against a provider
arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an
improvement.
In passing this legislation, the Legislature expressly stated that its purpose is to
impose a period of limitation and repose upon all causes of action related to the installation
of the improvement. The statute contains no language that would limit its application to
claims for construction defects, or to limit it in any other relevant sense. "Because the
legislature expressly set forth its intent and purpose in section 78-11-23 in enacting the
instant legislation, we do not look at its legislative history." Wood, 2002 UT 134, ^f 19. It
is unnecessary for the Court to investigate a full legislative history of the statute.
Even if the legislative history were relevant, it would show that the Statute of
Repose applies to virtually all causes of action. The Legislature considered what impact
this Statue of Repose should have on the limitation periods that may already exist and
stated "[t]his section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise
prescribed by law or a valid and enforceable contract." Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-21.5(9)
(emphasis added). Had the Legislature wanted to otherwise limit the Statute of Repose's
application or to carve out some exception, it would have expressly done so.

9

This position of the Supreme Court was explained in Lehi City v. Meling, 87 Utah
237, 48 P.2d 530, 535 (1935): "It is one of the objects of government to promote the
public welfare of the state and provide for the material prosperity of its people. It is for the
Legislature to determine the manner and extent to which it will exercise this function of
#174939

-23-

Moreover, such a review does not aid the analysis of the issue before this Court.
The statute has already been deemed constitutional. Therefore, the only question is
whether it should apply to all causes of action, even if the cause of action is quiet title or
trespass. Even if the full analysis of the legislative history showed that there was
discussion during the legislative process that the statute should be limited to only latent
defects in construction or workmanship, the fact remains that the legislation was enacted
without any such limiting language. By its passage of the legislation, the Legislature
rejected such arguments and points of view in favor of the all-inclusive language that this
statute of limitations and repose was to be effective against all causes of action.

government, and its determination upon that point is limited by its own discretion, and is
beyond the interference of the courts."
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IV. CONCLUSION
Questar respectfully requests this Court to affirm the ruling of the trial court that,
through the doctrine of after-acquired title, the Right-of-Way and Easement Grant is a valid
grant of the easement described, and, on independent grounds, that Traveller's claims
regarding the gas pipeline are barred by the Builder's Statute of Repose.
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of September 2004.
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ADDENDUM

Tab A

RIGHT-OF-WAY AND EASEMENT GRANT
PROGRESSIVE INVESTMENT CORP., a Nevada corporation, Trustee
9
Grantor, do(es) hereby convey and warrant to MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY COMPANY, a
Corporation of the State of Utah, Grantee, its successors and assigns, for the
sum of TEN DOLLARS ($10,00) and other good and valuable considerations, receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged, a right-of-way and easement
22,0 feet in
width to lay, maintain, operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace
pipe line8, valves, valve boxes and other gas transmission and distribution
facilities (hereinafter collectively called "facilities") through and across the
following described land and premises situated in the County of
Washington ,
State of Utah, to-wit:
Land of the Grantor located in the Northeast Quarter of Section 2,
Township 43 South, Range 16 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and the
Southeast Quarter of Section 35, Township 42 South, Range 16 West,
Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
the center line of said right-of-way and easement shall extend through and
across the above described land and premises as follows, to-wit:
Beginning at a point South 0°22 , 25 M East 652.67 feet along the section
line from the Northeast Corner of said Section 2; running thence North
63 p 57 , 51" West 1256.18 feet; thence North l°0r00" West 214.92 feet;
thence North 10°34,01" East 104.29 feet; thence North 8°12 f 13" West
167.39 feet; thence North l°01f00" West 745.10 feet; thence North
52°35 , 37" East 249.08 feet; thence North 34°40 , 41" East 324.06 feet,
more or less, to Grantor's Northeast property line.
TO HAVE AND TO HOLD the same unto the said Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
its successors and assigns, so long as such facilities shall be maintained,
with the right of ingress and egress to and from said right-of-way to maintain,
operate, repair, inspect, protect, remove and replace the same.
During
temporary periods Grantee may use such portion of the property along and
adjacent to said right-of-way as may be reasonably necessary in connection with
construction, maintenance, repair, removal or replacement of the facilities.
The said Grantor(s) shall have the right to use the said premises except for the
purposes for which this right-of-way and easement is granted to the said
Grantee, provided such use does not interfere with the facilities or any other
rights granted to the Grantee hereunder.
If the facilities are Installed at any point within a roadway or any point
that may be construed to be a road right-of-way, said installation is for
Grantee's convenience and shall not constitute an admission by Grantor(s) that
said right-of-way is available for public use.
The Grantor(s) shall not build or construct nor permit to be built or
constructed any building or other improvement except curb, gutter, driveways,
roadways, sidewalks, parking lot6, landscaping, sprinkling systems or similar
improvements over or across said right-of-way, nor change the contour tnereof
without written consent of Grantee. This right-of-way shall be binding upon and
iiwfire tcf-\ttae benefit of the successors and assigns of Grantor(s) and the
successors '.and assigns of the Grantee, and may be assigned in whole or in part
by Grantee.
13399171 BK 0640 PG Q586
RUSSELL SHIRTS * WASHINGTON CO RECORDER
1992 FEB 05 11:39 Art FEE
$3.00 BY PJ
REQUEST:flOUNTAIHFUEL SUPPLY CO

It is hereby understood that any parties securing this grant on behalf of
the Grantee are without authority to make any representations* covenants or
agreements not herein expressed.
WITNESS the execution hereof this

day of

, 19

PROGRESSIVE INVESTMENT CORP., a Nevada
Corporation, Trustee
Bradley A. Erickson, President

AGREED and WARRANTED:

STATE OF HAWAII

)
) 86,

County of

)

The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this
day of
, 1988, by Bradley A* Erickson, President of
Progressive Investment Corp., a Nevada corporation TrusteeMy Commission Expires:
Notary Public
Residing at

STATE OF UTAH
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Uieforegoiiig instrument was acknowledged before me this
^
day of
^X\eY*b*<
and Elizabeth L.
9 1988, by Rodney C* Burgess anc
Burgess,
^««WM»,#.

My Commission Expires:
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